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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
An expansion of these two exceptions to the general rule
may eventually accomplish the desired result, that is, an enforce-
ment of all such exclusive jurisdictional agreements where in-
equities would not result. In those jurisdictions which have ruled
on the question, it may eventually have to be accomplished by a
frank overruling of previous jurisprudence.
Louisiana is one of those jurisdictions in which the question
would be res nova. When the occasion arises to rule on such an
agreement, it is hoped that the court will not follow the example
of the other states and merely continue to mouth the doctrine of
the Nute and Morse cases and strike down the agreement as an
"attempt to oust the court of its jurisdiction." With the modern
tendency to give enforcement to the intention of the parties to
agreements validly entered into by mature individuals of equal
bargaining power, there is no reason why Louisiana should not
lead the way in fitting such agreements into the pattern of logical
juridical sequence.
WILLIAM E. SYKE*
INJUNCTIONS AGAINST SUITS IN FOREIGN
JURISDICTIONS
American rules of jurisdiction give a plaintiff a wide choice of
possible fora. Under the rules sanctioned by the Supreme Court
of the United States, jurisdiction in a suit in personam may be
exercised against an individual defendant not only by the state of
which he is a domiciliary' but also by any state in which he may
be personally served with process. 2 If the controversy arises out
of an automobile accident, suit may also be brought in the state
where the accident occurred.8 If the defendant is a corporation,
suit may be brought not only in the state in which it is incor-
porated4 but in any state in which it is "doing business."5 The
recent decision of International Shoe Company v. State of Wash-.
ingtonO implied that the plaintiff's electives may be extended
* Graduate of February 1950; presently Member, Alexandria Bar.
1. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 52 S.Ct. 252, 76 L.Ed. 375
(1932); Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934) § 79.
2. Fisher v. Fielding, 67 Conn. 91, 34 Atl. 714 (1895); Restatement, Con-
flict of Laws (1934) § 78.
3. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 47 S.Ct. 632, 71 L. Ed. 1091 (1927).
4. All states have statutes providing for personal service on domestic
corporations; Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934) § 87.
5. Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934) § 92.
6. 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95, 161 A.L.R. 1057 (1945).
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even further and that actions in personam may be brought against
both individuals and corporations in any state in which the
defendant or the transactions underlying the suit have such "min-
imum contacts... that. the maintenance of the suit does not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. '7 In addi-
tion to all these possibilities, suit may be brought as an action
quasi in remin any state in which the defendant owns property,8
as well as in any state in which personal jurisdiction can be
obtained over a debtor of the defendant.9 Finally, in practically
all cases, jurisdiction can be exercised in every state in which the
defendant has consented in advance to be sued 10 or where, by
entering an appearance, he expresses consent to be sued in the
particular case."
The choice of forum thus afforded to a plaintiff, which seems
to be wider than that available in any other country,12 easily
lends itself to abuse, as experience has shown. Two remedies
have been developed in order to protect a defendant against a
vexatious or otherwise abusive choice of a forum by the plaintiff.
In the suit brought against him, the defendant may raise the de-
fense of forum non conveniens and thus bring about a nonsuit if
the action is brought in a state court, or a transfer to a more ap-
propriate forum if the suit is in a federal court. However, this latter
remedy, while based upon foundations of respectable age, was not
very well known and, consequently, had not been widely used
until its possibilities were revealed to the profession less than
fifteen years ago by Professor Dainow'5 and others14 and has, sub-
sequently, obtained wide publicity through its recent applications
in the Supreme Court of the United States15 and its statutory
reception in the new federal judicial code.' 6 Resort was therefore
had to another protective device which remains useful today be-
cause, if successful, it allows the defendant to ignore any action
taken in the place in which the plaintiff has sued. This remedy is
7. Ibid.
8. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 24 L.Ed. 565 (1877).
9. Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934) § 108.
10. Id. at § 81.
11. Id. at § 82.
12. Stumberg, Conflict of Laws (1937) c. 4.
13. Dainow, The Inappropriate Forum (1935) 29 Ill. L. Rev. 867.
14. Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American
Law (1929) 29 Col. L. Rev. 1.
15. Miles v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 315 U.S. 698, 62 S.Ct. 827, 86 L.Ed. 1129,
146 A.L.R. 1104 (1942); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 67 S.Ct. 839,
91 L.Ed. 1055 (1947); Koster v. Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co., 330 U.S. 518,
67 S.Ct. 828, 91 L.Ed. 1055 (1947).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
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the obtaining of an injunction by the defendant, prohibiting the
plaintiff from beginning a threatened suit or further prosecuting
a suit already commenced in the jurisdiction of his choice. This
remedy pre-supposes, of course, that the state in which the
injunction is sought has jurisdiction over the original plaintiff,
and, in order to be effective, a factual possibility of punishing a
violation of the injunction as a contempt of court.
In this comment the person who chooses a foreign forum will
be called "the plaintiff." The person sued by him will be called
"the defendant," insofar as he is referred to in his character as a
person involved in the original suit brought against him by the
plaintiff; however, insofar as he is referred to as the person who
is endeavoring to enjoin the plaintiff from prosecuting the action
in the forum of his choice, the defendant will be referred to as
"the petitioner." The proceedings of the plaintiff against the
defendant will be referred to as "the action," and those of the
petitioner against the plaintiff will be called "the petition."
If personal jurisdiction over the plaintiff can be obtained
in the state of the petitioner, the injunctive remedy may appear
more attractive than resort to the defense of forum non con-
veniens. The remedy is of ancient origin. The use of the injunc-
tion was the most effective weapon of the Chancellor in his efforts
to supplement or modify the common law through equity,17 and
it was but a small step from enjoining a plaintiff from prosecuting
a suit in a common law court of England to enjoining him from
prosecuting a suit in a foreign jurisdiction. The oldest known case
of this latter kind is Harrison v. Gurney. 8 At the time of Story
the remedy was so well recognized that it was described by
him as follows:
"Although the courts of one country have no authority to
stay proceedings in the courts of another, they have an
undoubted authority to control all persons and things within
their own territorial limits. When, therefore, both parties
to a suit in a foreign country are residents within the terri-
torial limits of another country, the courts of equity in the
latter may act in personam upon those parties and direct
them, by injunction, to proceed no further in such suit. In
such a case, these .courts act upon acknowledged principles
of public law in regard to jurisdiction. They do not pretend
to direct or control the foreign court, but, without regard to
17. Maitland, Equity (2 ed. 1936) 1, 2.
1& 2 Jac. and W. 563 (Ch. 1821).
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the situation of the subject matter of the dispute, they con-
sider the equities between the parties and decree in personam
according to those equities, and enforce obedience to their
decrees by process in personam .... It is now held that when-
ever the parties are residents within a country, the courts of
that country have full authority to act upon them personally,
with respect to the subject of suits in a foreign country, as
the ends of justice may require; and, with that view to order
them to take, or omit to take, any steps or proceedings in
any other court of justice, whether in the same country, or
in any foreign country."'19
It is now generally recognized that a court having jurisdiction
in personam over the plaintiff may, upon a proper showing, enjoin
him from prosecuting an action in a court of a foreign jurisdic-
tion.20 This rule is firmly established in England,21 and it has
been said that the tendency is toward a liberal exercise of this
power by the courts.22 What elements or combination of elements
must be shown to exist in order to induce the court to grant the
injunction? The older cases indicated that such injunctions would
be issued but rarely, and the courts evidenced a greater reluc-
tance to grant relief in this instance than in other situations.
28
The present tendency is to apply ordinary equitable principles,
and no basic distinction is made between this type of injunction
and injunctions in general.24
There are three grounds commonly urged in order to secure
an injunction restraining a plaintiff from prosecuting an action
19. 2 Story, Equity Jurisprudence (4 ed. 1846) §§ 899, 900.
20. Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107, 10 S.Ct. 269, 33 L.Ed. 538 (1890).
For a general discussion of the subject see Comment (1941) 27 Iowa L. Rev.
76. For a discussion of Louisiana injunctions in general, see Bennett, Injunc-
tive Protection of Personal Interests-A Factual Approach (1939) 1 Louisi-
ANA LAW REVIEw 665; Rubin, The Mandatory Injunction in Louisiana
(1942) 4 LouISIANA LAW REVIEW 422. For a civilian background, see Brodeur,
The Injunction in French Jurisprudence (1939) 14 Tulane L. Rev. 211.
21. Harrison v. Gurney, 2 Jac. and W. 563 (Ch. 1821) (trustees were
enjoined from prosecuting concurrent litigation in Ireland); Carron Iron
Co. v. Maclaren, 5 H. L. Cas. 415 (1885); Ellerman Lines v. Read [1928] 2
K.B. 144 (the petitioner's ship was seized for a salvage claim in Constanti-
nople, Turkey, and judgment rendered accordingly. The plaintiff, a British
subject, was enjoined from further action in connection with the enforcement
of the Turkish judgment on the grounds that the injunction was obtained
by fraud); Port Arlington v. Soulby, 3 Myl. and K. 104, 40 Eng. Rep. 40
(1834); Bushby v. Munday, 5 Madd. Ch. 297, 56 Eng. Rep. 1908 (1821).
22. Comment (1920) 33 Harv. L. Rev. 92. This statement seems to be too
general. See Hanbury, Modern Equity (3 ed. 1943) 11, 78, 471; Keeton, An
Introduction to Equity (2 ed. 1948) 8 et seq.
23. Comment (1942) 22 Iowa L. Rev. 77, 86.
24. Comment (1920) 33 Harv. L. Rev. 92; Comment (1933) 31 Mich. L.
Rev. 88.
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in a foreign jurisdiction. 25 The first one is that the suit was
brought by the plaintiff in a foreign jurisdiction in order to gain
a procedural or substantive advantage; the second, that the suit
was brought in a foreign jurisdiction to harass the defendant; the
third, that regardless of what the plaintiff's motive was, a suit
brought in such jurisdiction results in additional expense and
inconvenience to the defendant that he would not have to suffer
if the suit were brought in the plaintiff's domicile or in some
other, more appropriate forum.
Suits Brought in a Foreign Jurisdiction to Gain an Advantage of
Procedure or Substance
(A) Procedural Advantages. Because courts are reluctant
to interfere with a person's right to seek a forum where he can
secure the best "bargain" or relief possible, as long as that forum
has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter,26 it has
been said that procedural differences are not sufficient to warrant
an injunction.2 7 The fact that the forum has different rules of
evidence, 2  or requires less than a unanimous jury to return a
verdict,29 or prohibits the jury from visiting the scene of the acci-
dent,30 or has a better system of enforcing judgments,31 or does
25. Dean Pound suggests the following classification: (1) Where the
foreign court lacks jurisdiction, (2) where there is concurrent litigation
pending or threatened, (3) attempts to reach exempt property by suing in
a foreign jurisdiction. He goes on to state that some courts are adding a
fourth: cases where the plaintiff is going to a foreign jurisdiction because
of more favorable views in procedural and substantive matters. He further
classifies under the first heading the three problems of power, adequacy of
the legal remedy, and exercise of discretion. Pound, The Progress of the
Law (1920) 33 Harv. L. Rev. 420, 425. Other grounds that do not conveniently
fit into any of the chosen categories occasionally arise. The most common
of these are fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Fraud and lack of jurisdiction,
if either can be shown to exist, are generally recognized as sufficient grounds
for an injunction. For a case involving the element of fraud, see Kempson
v. Kempson, 58 N.J. Eq. 94, 43 Atl. 97 (1899). For a case involving an allega-
tion of lack of jurisdiction, see Greenberg v. Greenberg, 218 App. Div. 1404,
218 N.Y. Supp. 87 (1st Dept. 1926).
26. Royal League v. Kavanaugh, 233 Ill. 175, 84 N.E. 178 (1908); Illinois
Life Ins. Co. v. Prentiss, 277 Ill. 383, 115 N.E. 554 (1917).
27. Comment (1933) 31 Mich. L. Rev. 88.
28. Edgell v. Clarke, 19 App. Div. 199, 45 N.Y. Supp. 979 (1st Dept. 1897),
where the petitioner sought an injunction in New York to restrain action
in Mississippi because Mississippi allowed oral proof of conversations held
with a party since deceased, while New York rejected such testimony.
29. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. v. Ball, 126 Kan. 745, 271 Pac. 313 (1929),
where the action was brought in Missouri, where nine concurring jurors may
render a verdict, and the petitioner sought an injunction in Kansas, where
a unanimous verdict is required.
30. Davis v. District Court of Tulsa Co., 129 Okla. 236, 264 Pac. 176
(1928); Pittsburg and L. E. R. Co v. Grimm, 28 Pa. Dist. R. 419 (1919); Chi-
cago, M. and St. P. R. R. v. McGinley, 75 Wis. 565, 185 N. W. 218 (1921).
31. Jones v. Hughes, 156 Iowa 684, 137 N.W. 1023 (1912); Grover v. Wood-
ward, 92 N.J. Eq. 227, 112 At. 412 (1920).
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not allow pre-trial examinations of the parties,32 or refuses to
allow a set-off,33 have been held insufficient to warrant the enjoin-
ing of the proceedings by another court.
(B) Substantive Advantages. If, in choosing a foreign forum,
the plaintiff is attempting, or the result is likely to be, a circum-
vention of a law (statutory or unwritten) which is regarded in
the state of the petitioner as belonging to its domain of public
policy,34 an injunction to prevent the plaintiff from using the
foreign forum usually is granted.3 5 The principal application of
this device has been in divorce proceedings. American courts in
divorce cases do not apply the choice of law technique, but apply
exclusively their own respective law once jurisdiction is estab-
lished on the basis of the plaintiff's domicile. As a result, it is
possible that a party may unilaterally abandon the common home,
establish a new domicile in another state and there obtain a
divorce upon a ground unknown, or even repugnant, to the law of
the hitherto common domicile. It may also happen that one party
to the marriage establishes himself in another state under circum-
stances which make it questionable whether he has obtained a
true domicile there, creating, however, such an appearance that
would induce a lenient court to find a domicile. The frequency of
suits to restrain the prosecution of divorce actions in other states
has apparently varied according to the liberality of the divorce
policy in the enjoining state. Such actions are relatively common
in New York, which recognizes only adultery as a ground for
dissolution of the marriage, 6 while no such cases have been dis-
covered in Nevada. Injunctions in such cases are generally issued
for the following reasons: (1) prevention of an evasion of the
divorce law of the enjoining state,37 (2) protection of the innocent
spouse from the harmful effects of the plaintiff's contemplated
32. Chicago, M. and St. P. R.R. v. McGinley, 175 Wis. 565, 185 N.W. 218
(1921).
33. Wells v. Menominee Boom Co., 203 Mich. 14, 168 N.W. 1011 (1918).
34. In many states, it is forbidden to bring suits in sister states for the
purpose of defeating exemptions; even where it is not criminal, the bringing
of such suits have been restrained as being violative of public policy. Wilson
v. Joseph, 107 Ind. 490, 8 N.E. 616 (1886); Teager v. Landsley, 69 Iowa 725
(1886); Hager v. Adams, 70 Iowa 746 (1886); Wierse v. Thomas, 145 N.C.
261, 59 S.E. 58 (1907). Perhaps the best-known case on the point is Bigelow
v. Old Dominion Co., 74 N.J. Eq. 457, 71 Atl. 153 (1908). The public policy
that is considered as being violated may, but does not have to, depend upon
a legislative act for its existence. For cases dealing with injunctions where
the forum was chosen to circumvent statutes existing in the domiciliary
state, see Weaver v. Alabama Great Southern Ry., 200 Ala. 432, 76 So. 364
(1917); O'Haire v. Burns, 45 Colo. 432, 101 Pac. 755 (1909).
35. Ibid.
36. New York Civil Practice Act, § 1147.
37. Johnson v. Johnson, 146 Misc. 93, 261 N.Y. Supp. 523 (1933).
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conduct,38 and (3) prevention of the perpetration of a fraud on
the courts of the sister state.39 Prior to 1942, under the rule of
Haddock v. Haddock,4 the domiciliary state of the defendant
was not required to recognize a divorce decree under the full
faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution if the
state wherein the divorce was granted was not, at the time of
the granting of the divorce, the state of matrimonial domicile.
Upon this basis, the New York court in Goldstein v. Goldstein41
refused to enjoin a spouse who was prosecuting a divorce action
in Florida because the decree would be a nullity in New York,
and hence all the defendant wife could suffer would be annoyance
and injury to her feelings. This view seems unduly harsh, and
other courts have reached a contrary result on similar facts.42
The Illinois court in the case of Kahn v. Kahn43 stated that it re-
garded the dissent in the Goldstein case as more persuasive than
the majority opinion, and that in any event, the rule of the
Haddock case had been overruled by the first case of Williams v.
North Carolina.44 This view was followed in the case of Russell
v. Russell45 where H and W were married in 1937 and were domi-
ciled in Illinois. In 1941, W, in Illinois, filed a complaint for
divorce, which was later amended to a petition for separate main-
tenance. H commenced proceedings for a divorce in Nevada and
W petitioned the Illinois court for an injunction restraining fur-
ther prosecution of his action until there had been a determina-
tion of the pending litigation in Illinois. The trial court found
that H's residence in Nevada was colorable, that his action con-
stituted a fraud on the defendant and the State of Illinois and
issued the injunction. On appeal, the action of the trial court
was sustained.
Under certain conditions, creditors will not be allowed to
resort to a foreign jurisdiction in order to gain an advantage
over other creditors.4 6
38. Greenberg v. Greenberg, 218 App. Div. 104, 218 N.Y. Supp. 87 (1926).
39. Usen v. Usen, 136 Me. 480, 13 A.(2d) 738 (1940).
40. 201 U.S. 562, 26 S.Ct. 525 (1906).
41. 283 N.Y. 146, 27 N.E. (2d) 969 (1940).
42. Usen v. Usen, 136 Me. 480, 13 A.(2d) 738 (1940); Kahn v. Kahn, 325
Ill. App. 137, 59 N.E.(2d) 874 (1945).
43. Ibid.
44. 317 U.S. 287, 63 S.Ct. 207 (1942).
45. 329 Ill. App. 580, 70 N.E.(2d) 70 (1946).
46. The following acts by over zealous creditors have been enjoined:
Attempted evasion of the state's exemption laws, Wilson v. Joseph, 107 Ind.
490, 8 N.E. 616 (1886); Munaper v. Wilson, 72 Iowa 163, 33 N.W. 449 (1887);
Griggs v. Doctor, 89 Wis. 161, 61 N.W. 761 (1895); Attempt to reach property
temporarily in another state, Munaper v. Wilson, 72 Iowa 163, 33 N. W. 449
(1887); Stewart v. Thompson, 97 Ky. 575, 31 S.W. 133 (1895); Attempt to gain
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In theory, it should never be necessary for one court to re-
strain a suit in a foreign forum on the ground that the plaintiff
is seeking an advantage of substantive law. Under ordinary con-
flict of law rules, the substantive law applied to any single cause
of action should be the same law, regardless of the forum. How-
ever, as each state is the judge of its own choice of law rules,47
two different states may apply different rules to the same cause
of action. Where the difference of the conflict of laws rules would
result in a serious difference of substantive law, injunctions have
occasionally been granted. For example, Louisiana restrained a
wrongful death action in Mississippi because under Mississippi
law, brothers and sisters could maintain the action, but Louisiana
law would limit, under the particular facts involved, the right of
action to the parents. 4  Maryland, which did not allow attach-
ment of wages where the debt owed is less than one hundred
dollars, enjoined an attachment of wages made in the State of
West Virginia where the debt was less than one hundred dollars
and payable in Maryland.49 In Dinsmore v. Neresheimei"° an
injunction was granted to stay prosecution in the District of
Columbia of a suit which involved the interpretation and validity
of a clause in a contract. A similar clause had been interpreted as
contrary to the public policy of the District of Columbia, while
New York, "the place of contracting" for the contract involved,
had held such clauses valid.
However, in the majority of cases, the courts refuse to grant
injunctions when sought on the sole ground that the substantive
law in the two states involved is different. The courts usually
point out that the court of the forum, by use of its choice of law
rules, will apply the proper substantive law to the controversy.5 1
a preference after a general assignment for the benefit of creditors, Hawkins
v. Ireland, 64 Minn. 339, 67 N.W. 73 (1896); Kendall v. McClure Coke Co.,
182 Pa. 1, 27 Atl. 823 (1897); Evasion of local insolvency laws, Cole v. Cun-
ningham, 133 U.S. 107, 10 S.Ct. 269, 33 L.Ed. 538 (1890); Attempt to beat the
local distribution of assets by administrators, Davis v. Butters Lumber Co.,
132 N.C. 233, 43 S.E. 650 (1903). For a more detailed discussion of the subject,
see Comments (1941) 27 Iowa L. Rev. 76, (1932) 31 Mich. L. Rev. 88, (1934)
13 N.C. L. Rev. 235.
47. At least insofar as the state's discretion is not limited by the Con-
stitution of the United States, particularly the "full faith and credit clause"
and the "due process clause" of the Fourteenth Amendment. See in this
respect Cheatham, Internal Law Distinctions in the Conflict of Laws (1936)
21 Corn. L. Q. 570; Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of
the Constitution (1945) 45 Col. L. Rev. 1.
48. New Orleans and N.E. R. Co. v. Bernick, 178 La. 153, 150 So. 860
(1933).
49. Keyser v. Rice, 47 Md. 203, 28 Am. Rep. 448 (1877).
50. 32 Hun 204 (N.Y. 1884).
51. See Annotation, Injunction against bringing or prosecuting action
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Suits Brought in Foreign Jurisdictions Solely for Harassment
Purposes
It is generally conceded that a suit brought in a foreign juris-
diction solely to harass, worry or inconvenience the defendant by
forcing him to defend a law suit in a remote place will be en-
joined.52 It is difficult to determine when such are the motives
prompting the plaintiff to bring suit.13 Such motives may be in-
ferred from the fact that a suit on the same set of facts is pending
in another jurisdiction.54
Suits Brought in Foreign Jurisdictions that Create Added Ex-
pense and Inconvenience for the Defendant
Even if the plaintiff has a reason other than harassment for
choosing a foreign forum, the disadvantages to the defendant may
outweigh any advantages to the plaintiff. As expressed by the
Michigan court:
"It is not to be denied that much hardship is likely to arise
where a person is called upon to defend himself against a
charge arising out of transactions occurring at a distance, and
out of the jurisdiction. Witnesses cannot always be compelled
or induced to be present at the trial."'5
Generally speaking, a suit in a foreign jurisdiction will not
be restrained merely because it is more convenient for the peti-
tioner to litigate the subject matter of the suit in another forum. 56
However, all courts do not apply this general rule, and some have
granted injunctions on grounds of mere inconvenience. 7 For
in another state or country because of the danger that result would be
different from that which would be reached in the jurisdiction whose law
is the proper governing law as regards matters of substance, 69 A.L.R. 591
(1930).
52. Wabash Ry. v. Peterson, 187 Iowa 1331, 175 N.W. 523 (1919).
53. The burden is on the petitioner to show that the plaintiff received
no benefits from his choice of forum.
54. Where the plaintiff receives no visible benefits from choosing a
foreign forum, it is an indication that the suit may be vexatious. Standard
Rolling Bearing Co. v. Crucible Steel Co., 71 N.J. Eq. 61, 63 Atl. 546 (1906);
Claflin v. Hamlin, 62 How. Pr. 284 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1881); Comment (1925) 34
Yale L.J. 912.
55. Great Western Ry. v. Miller, 19 Mich. 305, (1859).
56. This is the conclusion reached by most writers on the subject. For
example, see Annotation, Injunctions on grounds of inconvenience against
prosecution of an action in a particular state or district, 57 A.L.R. 77 (1928),
115 A.L.R. 237 (1937). It is difficult to tell exactly what part "inconvenience"
plays, as most cases have other factors as different procedural rules, etc.
The principal items alleged as causing extra expense and inconvenience are
(1) lack of compulsory process for defense witnesses, (2) cost and ineffective-
ness of depositions, (3) added attorney fees.
57. Cases where injunctions were granted wholly or in part on grounds
of inconvenience: Baltimore and Ohio R.R. v. Bale, 31 F. Supp. 221 (N.D.
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example, the Federal District Court in West Virginia granted an
injunction restraining a suit under the Federal Employers' Liabil-
ity Act brought in an Indiana state court when the cause of action
arose in West Virginia and the plaintiff and all witnesses resided
there.58 The Indiana court approved the issuance of an injunction
under identical circumstances except that the suit was brought
in Missouri. 59 However, other courts under similar fact situations
have denied injunctions.60
Prior to the case of Baltimore and Ohio Railroad v. Kepner,"'
the venue section of the Federal Employers' Liability Act 62 was
W.Va. 1940), noted in (1940) 46 W. Va. L. Q. 344 (discussed above); McCon-
nell v. Thompson, 200 N. E. 96 (Ind. 1936), noted in (1936) 21 St. Louis L. Rev.(discussed above); Ex parte Crandall, 53 F.(2d) 650 (App. D.C. 1931), affirmed
53 F.(2d) 969 (1931), certiorari denied 285 U.S. 540, 52 S.Ct. 312, 76 L.Ed. 992(1932) (suit under federal employers' liability act in a Missouri state court
for a death occurring in Tennessee, the major complaint being the cost of
transporting defense witnesses to the trial); Cleveland, C. C. and St. L. R.
Co. v. Shelly, 96 Ind. App. 273, 170 N.E. 328 (1930) (suit in Missouri when
all defendant's witnesses resided in Indiana); Kern v. Cleveland, C. C. and
St. L. R. Co., 204 Ind. 595, 185 N.E. 466 (1933) (death in Indiana and suit
brought under federal employers' liability act in Missouri); Bankers' Life
Co. v. Loring, 217 Iowa 534, 250 N.W. 8 (1933) (Iowa citizen sued another
Iowa citizen under an insurance policy issued in Iowa, the forum chosen
being Minnesota). This list of cases is illustrative and does not purport to
be a complete list of all the cases on the point.
58. Baltimore and Ohio R.R. v. Bale, 31 F. Supp. 221 (N.D. W.Va. 1940),
noted in (1940) 46 W. Va. L.Q. 344.
59. McConnell v. Thompson, 200 N.E. 96 (Ind. 1936), noted in (1936) 21
St. Louis L. Rev. 348.
60. Cases in which injunctions were denied where the grounds were
inconvenience to the parties: Chesapeake and 0. R. Co. v. Vigor, 90 F.(2d) 7
(C.C.A. 6th, 1937), certiorari denied 302 U.S. 705, 58 S.Ct. 25, 82 L.Ed. 545(1937); Mobile and 0. R. Co. v. Parrent, 260 Ill. App. 284 (1931); Wabash R.
Co. v. Lindsey, 269 Ill. App. 152 (1933); Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co. v. Ball,
126 Kan. 745, 271 Pac. 313 (1928); New Orleans Brewing Co. v. Cahall, 188 La.
749, 178 So. 339, 115 A.L.R. 231 (1937); Southern Pac. Co. v. Baum, 39 N.M.
22, 38 P.(2d) 1106 (1934); Banuso v. Angwin, 166 Kan. 469, 201 P.(2d) 1057(1949), where the court said, "The fact that a large number of the witnesses
to be called In the case reside in this state, where the cause of action accrued,
making it necessary' to take depositions instead of oral testimony; that trial
procedure in the sister state is different from that in this state; that a
verdict may be rendered by nine concurring jurors in the sister state; that
the parties will be put to considerable additional expense and inconvenience;
that delay will result because of the crowded condition of the docket in
the sister state-are not in and of themselves sufficient grounds for enjoin-
ing a party from commencing and prosecuting an action in such sister
state." This list of cases is illustrative and does not purport to be a complete
list of all the cases on the subject.
61. Baltimore and Ohio R.R. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44, 62 S.Ct. 6, 86 L.Ed.
37 (1941); same case in the Ohio State Court, 137 Ohio St. 206, 28 N. E.
586, 30 N.E.(2d) 982 (1940). Actually the Kepner case dealt with the enjoining
by a state court of a suit under the Federal Employers' Liability Act pending
in a federal district court. The issue as to whether one state court could
enjoin another state court in such cases was settled in the negative by Miles
v. Illinois C. R.R., 315 U.S. 698, 62 S.Ct. 177, 86 L.Ed. 484 (1942).
62. 35 Stat. 66 (1910), 36 Stat. 291 (1911), 45 U.S.C.A. § 56.
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the cause of much doubt in both state and federal courts.63
Kepner, an employee of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Com-
pany, was injured in Ohio. Kepner was a resident of Ohio; the
railroad was a Maryland corporation with lines in Ohio and New
York. Under the authority of the venue section of the Federal
Employers' Liability Act (which allows an action to be brought
in a United States District Court in the district of the defendant's
residence, or in which the cause of action arose, or in which the
defendant is doing business at the time of the commencement of
such action, or in a-state court of competent jurisdiction) Kepner
brought suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York. The railroad asked the Ohio courts to
enjoin Kepner on the grounds that the forum was seven hundred
miles from the place of the accident and that it would cost the
railroad approximately four 'thousand dollars to transport its
twenty-five witnesses to New York. The Ohio courts refused to
grant an injunction, and the case finally reached the United States
Supreme Court, where it was held that a state court could not
interfere with the privilege granted by the venue section of the
Federal Employers' Liability Act on the grounds of inconveni-
ence, harassment and extra expense. Three judges dissented on
the grounds that the result was an implied repudiation of the
doctrine of forum non conveniens.
In the recent case of Zayatz v. Southern Railway Company, 4
an injunction was coupled with a declaratory judgment action
to obtain a result contrary to that of the Kepner case. Zayatz
executed a written release of a claim for injuries sustained while
engaged as a switchman for the railroad. Later when the railroad
was advised of the likelihood of its being sued in St. Louis, Mis-
souri, for these injuries, it applied for a declaratory judgment
in Alabama to construe the release and the rights thereunder. It
sought, also, an injunction to restrain Zayatz from initiating suit
in another forum on the ground that the prosecution in any place
63. This confusion has come back to plague the federal courts since
the passage of the new liberal change of venue provisions of the new Judicial
Code (discussed supra p. 303). The federal district courts were split as to
whether Section 1404(a) applied to suits filed under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act, see Comment (1949) 10 U. of Pitt. L. Rev. 390 (1949). The
Supreme Court, in Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 69 S.Ct. 944, 93 L.Ed. 901
(1949) held that Section 1404(a) does apply to the Federal Employers Liabil-
ity Act cases. Now, while the action may be brought in any place permitted
by the venue provisions of the Federal Employers Liability Act, the federal
district judge may order Its transfer to another district under Section
1404 (a).
64. 248 Ala. 137, 26 So.(2d) 545 (1946), cert. denied 329 U.S. 789, 67 S.Ct.
353, 91 L.Ed. 676 (1946).
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other than Alabama would be inequitable, vexatious, and harass-
ing to the railroad and a burden on interstate commerce. The
Supreme Court of Alabama held that there was adequate basis
for the declaration and injunction, stating expressly that the
Federal Employers' Liability Act was not involved.
Louisiana's Approach to the Subject
The device of injunction has not been used extensively to
prevent persons subject to the personal jurisdiction of Louisiana
courts from taking their causes of action elsewhere to be liti-
gated.6 5 Louisiana cases are in accord with the general rule that a
party may, upon a proper showing, be enjoined from prosecuting
an action in a court of another state.6 6 An injunction will not be
granted upon the mere allegation that the courts of Louisiana
are better able to do substantial justice between the parties;
neither will the Louisiana courts act on the basis of any distrust
by them of the courts of another state.6 7 In an early Louisiana
case the petitioner alleged that the plaintiffs were seeking an
undue advantage over petitioner's other creditors by suing in
New York. 8 He sought to enjoin this New York suit. In denying
the injunction, the court pointed out that the plaintiffs had a legal
right to seize property located in New York as a basis for suit
and, furthermore, that there was nothing unjust or unfair about
an active creditor's attempting to gain an advantage over a less
active creditor when the estate of the common debtor was insuf-
ficient to satisfy all claims.
In the case of Lancaster v. Dunn,6 9 Mrs. Dunn, a resident of
Louisiana, sued in a state court at Marshall, Texas, under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act for the death of her husband,
which had occurred near Maringouin, Louisiana. The petitioner,
defendant in that action, sought an injunction in Louisiana, alleg-
ing that under ordinary circumstances the action would not have
been brought at Marshall, Texas, which is two hundred and sixty-
one miles from Maringouin, but would have been brought at
65. Up to November, 1949, there have been only six reported cases, all
in state courts, dealing with this subject matter as it pertains to Louisiana.
66. Commercial Soap Works v. F. A. Lambert Co., 49 La. Ann. 459, 21
So. 639 (1897); Lancaster v. Dunn, 153 La. 15, 95 So. 385 (1922); Missouri
Pac. Ry. v. Harden, 158 La. 889, 105 So. 2 (1925); New Orleans and N.E. R.R.
v. Bernick, 178 La. 153, 150 So. 860 (1933); New Orleans Brewing Co. v. Cahall,
188 La. 749, 178 So. 339, 115 A.L.R. 231 (1937); Natalbany Lumber Co. v.
McGraw, 188 La. 863, 178 So. 377 (1938).
67. Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Harden, 158 La. 889, 105 So. 2 (1925). There
is no indication as to whether "state" includes a foreign country.
68. Commercial Soap Works v. F. A. Lambert Co., 49 La. Ann. 459, 21 So.
639 (1897).
69. 153 La. 15, 95 So. 385 (1922).
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Maringouin, Louisiana, where all the witnesses lived, and that it
would be expensive and inconvenient for the defendant to defend
the suit elsewhere.7 The injunction was refused on the ground
that Congress by statute had expressly given litigants like Mrs.
Dunn the right to sue in Texas, and that mere inconvenience to
the defendant was not a sufficient reason to deny her that right.7 '
In Missouri Pacific Railway Company v. Harden,72 the
plaintiff brought suit in Mississippi for injuries sustained in Lou-
isiana. The petitioner, a Missouri corporation, urged several
grounds 73 as bases for an injunction, but was probably motivated,
so the court thought, by the desire to have the suit brought in a
state where it could be removed to the federal courts on grounds
of diversity of citizenship. The injunction was refused.
The case of New Orleans Brewing Company v. Cahall7 4 pre-
sented clearly the issue of whether the defendant in a foreign
lawsuit is entitled to an injunction solely because it is more con-
venient and less expensive for him to defend lawsuits at his home.
The Louisiana court refused to grant the injunction.7 5
However, the Louisiana court did grant an injunction in
New Orleans and N. E. Railroad Company v. Bernick.76 A little
girl was killed while playing on the defendant's track in New
Orleans; the brothers and sisters of the deceased, who were resi-
dents of Louisiana, and her parents, whose residences were not
stated, brought a wrongful death action in Mississippi. The de-
fendant succeeded in enjoining the brothers and sisters because
they were not proper parties to institute such action under Louisi-
70. The petitioner also raised the usual issue that Texas had juries
whose findings of fact are conclusive. This is a standard allegation in every
petition filed in Louisiana in this type of injunction suit.
71. The court actually listed three reasons for its decisions. The other
two were (1) the plaintiff had qualified as administratrix of her husband's
estate in Texas, (2) Louisiana's equity power is limited by Article 21 of the
Civil Code. Evidently the court conveniently overlooked Article 303, La. Code
of Practice of 1870.
72. 158 La. 889, 105 So. 2 (1925).
73. The various allegations were (1) different procedure and practice
in Mississippi, (2) was a harassment suit, (3) was brought for fraudulent
purposes, (4) Mississippi juries are prejudiced against railroads, (5) it was
inconvenient and expensive to the defendant to be forced to defend the suit
in Mississippi.
74. 188 La. 749, 178 So. 339, 115 A.L.R. 231 (1937).
75. The factual situation was such that if the injunction had been
granted it would have meant a shift from the defendant to the plaintiff of
the extra expense and inconvenience. The case could be distinguished on
Its weak factual basis if the issue is squarely put to the court again.
76. 178 La. 153, 150 So. 860 (1933).
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ana law.77 The court also pointed out that in Mississippi the jury
is the sole judge of the facts. 78
In Natalbany Lumber Company v. McGraw,79 the plaintiff, a
Louisiana resident, brought an action in Mississippi against a
Louisiana corporation, for personal injuries suffered in Louisiana.
The defendant obtained an injunction on the ground that in
Louisiana he could urge contributory negligence, whereas under
Mississippi law the doctrine of comparative negligence obtained.80
In an unreported case, 8' the petitioner succeeded in enjoin-
ing a suit in Mississippi on the allegation that Mississippi had a
"privileged communication act" and Louisiana did not, and that
the plaintiff was seeking to benefit by that fact. 2
In all cases where the Supreme Court of Louisiana has
allowed an injunction of this type, both parties have been resi-
dents of the State of Louisiana.83 This might indicate that Louisi-
ana is in accord with the policy of limiting the issuance of such
injunctions to situations in which both parties are local resi-
dents s. 8 4
In the case of New Orleans Brewing Company v. Cahall, it
was said that Louisiana would not enjoin a local resident from
prosecuting a suit elsewhere simply because of the possibility of
his obtaining a procedural advantage.8 5 However, where the effect
of the foreign suit is to give the plaintiff a substantive advantage
77. Would this case have been different if the plaintiff had used the
strategy of the plaintiff in the Harden case [Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Harden,
158 La. 889, 105 So. 2 (1925)] and had a Mississippi attorney testify to the
fact Mississippi would apply Louisiana law in such cases?
78. This is a make-weight argument that has been urged in all cases
by the petitioner and ignored by the court unless the injunction Is to be
granted, in which case it is stressed.
79. 188 La. 863, 178 So. 377 (1938).
80. See note 77, supra.
81. This was the Injunction that gave rise to the case of Equitable
Life Assurance Society v. Gex's Estate, 184 Miss. 577, 186 So. 659 (1939),
noted in (1940) 12 Miss. L. J. 512, where the Mississippi court held that such
injunctions issued by Louisiana courts can be used as a special plea in bar
in Mississippi.
82. This is the only allegation urged by the petitioner that had not
already been turned down by the Louisiana Supreme Court.' See note 96,
infra.
83. New Orleans and N.E. R.R. v. Bernick, 178 La. 153, 150 So. 860
(1933); Natalbany Lumber Co. v. McGraw, 188 La. 863, 178 So. 377 (1938).
84. 2 Story, Equity Jurisprudence (4 ed. 1846) § 899. The policy of
limiting Injunctions to situations where both parties are local residents has
not gained widespread recognition. For a case applying the rule, see
Barrett v. Russell, 135 N.Y. Supp. 34 (1912).
85. New Orleans Brewing Co. v. Cahall, 188 La. 749, 178 So. 339, 115
A.L.R. 231 (1937).
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he would not enjoy in Louisiana, it would seem that an injunction
would be readily obtainable.86
Dictum in one Louisiana case is in accord with the general
rule that litigants who prosecute their claims in a foreign juris-
diction solely for harassment or fraudulent purposes will be
enjoined.87
The Converse Situation
Generally speaking, the issuance of an injunction by a state
restraining its citizens from prosecuting an action elsewhere is,
in effect, a judicial order to bring the action within that state or
not at all. The court takes jurisdiction in personam of the parties
and orders the plaintiff bringing the action in another state or
country to refrain from further action in regard to that suit. The
party so ordered is subject to the usual punishment for contempt
of court for non-compliance with the injunction, but such nega-
tive enforcement does not determine the issue of the main con-
troversy. If the plaintiff disregards the injunction, its effective-
ness will depend upon whether the foreign court will "recog-
nize" the injunction to the extent of dismissing the action.88
While, of course, injunctions are entitled to full faith and credit,
it is generally held that this does not require one state to "en-
force" an injunction issued by another state.89 An attempt to
establish a duty of enforcement by federal legislation failed 0
Some state courts go further, however, and enforce the foreign
injunction by sustaining it as a special plea in bar when pleaded
86. Thus, the mere fact that State X does not allow an appellate
review of the findings of fact while Louisiana does is not sufficient grounds
for an injunction to prevent a Louisiana citizen from litigating his claim
in State X. However, if State X goes further and uses a different negli-
gence doctrine than Louisiana, or allows different parties to sue, or has
different rules of evidence then sufficient grounds for an injunction exists.
87. Missouri Pac. Ry. v; Harden, 158 La. 889, 105 So. 2 (1925).
88. Comment (1930) 39 Yale L. J. 719; Wall, Conflict of Laws-Injunc-
tion Restraining. Party from Bringing Suit in Another State-Recognition
of Decree in Second State (1940) 12 Miss. L. J. 512; Johnston, Recognition
of Foreign Injunction Restraining Proceedings (1942) 21 Neb. L. Rev. 160.
89. See Comment (1930) 39 Yale L. J. 719; Note (1933) 31 Mich. L. Rev.
963. That equitable decrees are entitled to full faith and' credit, see Stum-
berg, Conflict of Laws (1937) 117; Goodrich, Conflict of Laws (1938) 556.
This point has not been passed on by the United States Supreme Court;
however, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the Missouri case of
Kepner v. C.C.C. and St. Louis R.R., 322 Mo. 299, 15 S.W.(2d) 825 (1929),
in which the Missouri court refused recognition on ground of full faith
and credit. Certiorari was also refused in the Minnesota case of Frye v.
Chicago Ry., 157 Minn. 52, 195 N. W. 629 (1923).
90. The American Bar Association caused a bill to be introduced In
Congress providing for the recognition of all equitable decrees under the
full0faith and credit clause, 52 Am. Bar Rep. 292, 319 (1927). .
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as a defense in litigation pending in that state.9 1 The majority of
the courts which give such effect to the foreign injunction view
all the factors giving rise to the restraining order as if they were
passing on a plea of forum non conveniens rather than merely de-
ciding whether to give effect to a foreign injunction. There are
more cases disregarding the injunction than there are ones giving
it force and effect by sustaining it as a special plea in bar; how-
ever, it is suggested that a critical analysis of the cases reveals
that this is misleading, because the decisions show the effect of
other considerations, and hence they are not the result of a
simple election between either recognizing or disregarding the
foreign injunction.9 2 The principal argument against recognition
is that the court is forced by the privileges and immunity clause
of the Federal Constitution to permit the foreign resident to bring
and prosecute to a conclusion his action in the local court.9 3
Among the states that do give effect to foreign injunctions is
Mississippi, with her liberal juries and limited appellate power.9 4
In the case of Equitable Life Assurance S6ciety v. Gex's Estate,95
a Louisiana resident, Mrs. Kathryn Gillin, brought an action in
the circuit court of Hancock County, Mississippi. She assigned
a half interest in her claim to a firm of Mississippi attorneys. The
91. Among the cases giving recognition to the injunction are Allen
v. Chicago, Great Western R.R., 229 Ill. App. 38 (1925), noted in (1926) 20
Ill. L. Rev. 816; Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Gex's Estate, 184
Miss. 577, 186 So. 659 (1939), noted in (1940) 12 Miss. L. J. 512; Fisher v.
Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., 112 Miss. 30, 72 So. 846 (1916).
92. Comment (1930) 39 Yale L. J. 719.
93. The leading case so holding is State ex rel. Bossung v. District
Court, 140 Minn. 494, 168 N.W. 589, 1 A.L.R. 145 (1918). In this case both
parties were residents of Iowa. The cause of action arose out of a death
in Nebraska; an action was commenced in rem in Minnesota; a Nebraska
court issued a temporary injunction. The lower Minnesota court then stayed
the proceedings, but the plaintiff was successful in a mandamus suit to
compel further proceeding with the case. The United States Supreme Court
has since killed the contention that a court is bound to permit foreign
litigants to use the local courts by distinguishing between a "citizen" and
a "resident" insofar as the privileges and immunity clause is concerned
in Douglas v. N.Y., N.H. and H. R.R., 279 U.S. 377, 49 S.Ct. 355, 73 L.Ed.
747 (1929), noted in (1929) 18 Calif. L. Rev. 159, (1930) 24 Ill. L. Rev. 826,
(1929) 39 Yale. L. J. 388. Other cases rejecting an injunction as a special
defense are Nichols and Shepard Co. v. Wheeler, 150 Ky. 169, 150 S.W. 33
(1912) (no reasons were stated); Frye v. Chicago R.I.'and P. Ry., 157 Minn.
52, 195 N.W. 629 (1923); Union Pacific R.R. v. Rule, 155 Minn. 302, 193
N.W. 161 (1923); Kepner v. Cleveland, C.C. and St. Louis Ry., 322 Mo. 299,
15 S.W.(2d) 825 (1929); Chicago, R.I. and Pac. Ry. v. Lundquist, 206 Iowa
499, 221 N.W. 288 (1928).
94. Although it is never cited as a sufficient reason standing by itself
to support an injunction, the Louisiana court always points out that the
party who sues in a foreign jurisdiction, usually Mississippi, has the advan-
tage of a trial before a jury whose findings of fact are not subject to
correction by an appellate court.
95. 184 Miss. 577, 186 So. 659 (1939), noted in (1940) 12 Miss L. J. 512.
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insurance company secured a preliminary injunction from the
District Court for the Parish of Orleans, State of Louisiana, re-
straining Mrs. Gillin from further prosecution of the Mississippi
suit.96 This injunction, even though it had expired, was honored
as a plea in abatement against the heirs of one of the Mississippi
attorneys who brought a partition suit as to the assigned one-half
interest of Mrs. Gillin's claim. The court recognized that the
injunction would apply to any Mississippi suit seeking to litigate
the insurer's alleged liability. The court stated that Mississippi
residents who had personal knowledge of the injunction were
bound to honor it even though the Louisiana court did not have
jurisdiction to render such an injunction against them personally.
Although at least two other states have granted injunctions
restraining a resident from prosecuting a suit in the Louisiana
courts,9 7 there are no cases or dicta, either by the Louisiana courts
or the federal courts sitting in Louisiana, as to what effect would
be given to such a foreign injunction. There is an indication that
Louisiana would, for comity reasons, refuse to proceed further
with a lawsuit when the plaintiff had been enjoined by the courts
of a foreign state or a federal court sitting in a foreign state. 8
It could hardly be consistent or logical for a state court to
refuse to honor an injunction granted by a foreign state court
and yet honor an injunction issued by a federal court sitting
in the same state. Although it is now easy to obtain jurisdiction
over corporate defendants in the federal courts,9 9 it would seem
illogical, in view of the newly granted power of transfer,100 for
one federal court to restrain a litigant from prosecuting an action
96. The grounds alleged for the injunction were (1) all the witnesses
resided in Louisiana; (2) suit was filed in Mississippi to subject the de-
fendant to extra expense and inconvenience; (3) suit was filed in Missis-
sippi to secure a trial by a jury whose findings of fact would be final;
(4) the plaintiff was seeking to take advantage of the Mississippi "Priv-
ileged Communication Statute" (between doctor and patient).
97. In Davis v. Natchez Hotel Co., 158 Miss. 43, 128 So. 871 (1930),
Mrs. Davis, the plaintiff in a suit instituted in New Orleans for the purpose
of harassing the defendant and forcing a compromise, was enjoined by
Mississippi court. Allen v. Buchanan, 97 Ala. 399 (1893).
98. The sole basis for this statement is the implications arising out
of New Orleans and N.E. R.R. v. Bernick, 178 La. 153, 150 So. 860 (1933).
99. A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is
incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business, and such
judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation for
venue purposes, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).
100. For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of
justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district
or division where it might have been brought, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). This is
at the discretion of-the district judge and may not be controlled by a
circuit court of appeals, Schoen v. Mountain Producers Corp., 170 F. (2d)
707, 5 A.L.R.(2d) 1226 (C.C.A. 3rd, 1949). See note 63, supra.
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in another federal court. Even if such an injunction were issued
by another federal court, it would appear that the federal court
in which the litigation was pending would transfer the case
rather than honor the injunction by sustaining it as a special
plea in bar. If the court felt that it had sufficient reasons to
refuse to transfer the case, surely the same reasons would be
sufficient for the court to disregard the injunction. Likewise, it
would seem that if a state court issued an injunction directed at
parties to a suit in a federal court, the federal court would trans-
fer the case to the federal district court for the district in which
the state court granting the injunction is located or to some other,
more convenient, federal court. Further, if the federal court
felt there were sufficient reasons to refuse transfer of the case,
then the same reasons should be sufficient for the federal court
to disregard the injunction.
JACK J. ROGERS*
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN PERSONAM:
RECIPROCITY
P procures a personal judgment in a foreign country against
A and then attempts to enforce it in B, a member state of the
United States of America. Is this judgment, when P seeks to
enforce it in State B, prima facie evidence only and hence ex-
aminable upon the merits or is it conclusive in its res judicata
effects and in an action for its enforcement? What difference
does it make whether or not the courts of foreign country A
regard the judgments of State B as conclusive proof of the
merits? Will the result be the same if the suit is brought in a
state court or in a federal court? The scope of this comment is
to resolve, if possible, these questions regarding the enforcement
of judgments of foreign countries.
At early common law, both in England' and in this country,2
the large majority of cases in which foreign judgments were
* Graduate of February 1950; presently Member, Lake Charles Bar.
1. Phillips v. Hunter, 2 H. B1. 402, 126 Eng. Reprint 618 (1795) ; Hall v.
Odber, 11 East. 118, 103 Eng. Reprint 949 (1809); Walker v. Witter, 1 Doug.
1, 99 Eng. Reprint 1 (1813); Arnott v. Redfern, 3 Bing. 353, 130 Eng. Reprint
549 (1826); Houlditch v. Donegal, 8 Bligh N.S. 301, 5 Eng. Reprint 955 (1834).
2 Black, The Law of Judgments (2 ed. 1902) 1234, § 825.
2. Burnham v. Webster, 1 Wood. & M. (U.S.) 172, Fed. Cas. No. 2,179
(C. C. D. Maine 1846); Bartlett v. Knight, 1 Mass. 401, 2 Am. Dec. 36 (1805).
See Aldrich v. Kinney, 4 Conn. 380, 10 Am. Dec. 151 (1822); Bissell v. Briggs,
9 Mass. 462, 6 Am. Dec. 88 (1812); Benton v. Burgot, 10 Serg. & R. 240 (Pa.
1823); Boston India Rubber Factory v. Hoit, 14 Vt. 92 (1842); Story, Conflict
of Laws (5 ed. 1857) 973, § 608.
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